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Depression, rational identity and the educational
imperative: concordance-ﬁnding in tricky diagnostic
moments
Paul K. Miller1 and Beth H. Richardson2
ABSTRACT It is well-documented, within most medical and much health psychology, that
many individuals ﬁnd diagnoses of depression confusing or even objectionable. Within a corpus
of research and practical clinical guidance dominated by the social-cognitive paradigm, the
explanation for resistance to a depression diagnosis (or advice pertaining to it) within speciﬁc
interactions is bordering on the canonical; patients misunderstand depression itself, often as an
output of an associated social stigma that distorts public knowledge. The best way to overcome
corollary resistance in situ is, logically thus, taken to be a clariﬁcation of the true (clinical) nature
of depression. In this paper, exploring the diagnosis of depression in UK primary care contexts,
the social-cognitive position embedded in contemporary medical reasoning around this matter
is critically addressed. It is ﬁrstly highlighted how, even in a great deal of extant public health
research, the link between an individual holding “correct”medical knowledge and being actively
compliant with it is far from inevitable. Secondly, and with respect to concerns around direct
communication in clinical contexts, a body of research emergent of Discursive Psychology and
Conversation Analysis is explored so as to shed light on how non-cognitive concerns (not least
those around the local interactional management of a patient’s social identity) that can inform
the manner in which ostensibly “tricky” medical talk plays-out in practice, especially in cases
where a mental illness is at stake. Finally, observations are drawn together in a formal
Discursive Psychological analysis of a small but highly illustrative sample of three cases where
a depression diagnosis is initially questioned or disputed by a patient in primary care but,
following further in-consultation activity, concordance with the diagnosis is ultimately reached
—a speciﬁc issue hitherto unaddressed in either DP or CA ﬁelds. These cases speciﬁcally reveal
the coordinative attention of interlocutors to immediate concerns regarding how the patient
might maintain a sense of being an everyday and rational witness to their own lives; indeed, the
very act of challenging the diagnosis emerges as a means by which a patient can open up
conversational space within the consultation to address such issues. While the veracity of the
social-cognitive model is not deemed to be without foundation herein, it is concluded that
attention to local interactional concerns might ﬁrstly be accorded, such that the practical social
concerns and skills of practitioners and patients alike might not be overlooked in the endeavour
to produce generally applicable theories.
DOI: 10.1057/palcomms.2017.33 OPEN
1 University of Cumbria, Lancaster, UK 2 University of Central Lancashire, Preston, UK
PALGRAVE COMMUNICATIONS | 3:17033 |DOI: 10.1057/palcomms.2017.33 |www.palgrave-journals.com/palcomms 1
Introduction
In contemporary psychological research, particularly in theclinical and health domains, there is a widely-reported concernthat many individuals ﬁnd diagnoses of depression troubling
or even objectionable, and will often show some form of active
resistance when the diagnosis is made (Van Voorhees et al.,
2005; Highﬁeld et al., 2010; Wimsatt et al., 2015). Within this
body of literature, the explanation for such resistance and the
proposed mechanism for overcoming it are bordering on the
canonical. Ultimately, resistance is taken to be an output
of the patient in some way misunderstanding the fundamental
nature or implications of depression itself, often as an output of a
broader social stigma attached to the condition (Van Voorhees
et al., 2006; Corrigan and Wassel, 2008). Consequently, and
logically, the proffered solution stems from a singular proposi-
tion: “education is the key” to backﬁlling or correcting that
patient’s knowledge, given that it is likely (and respectively)
incomplete or distorted (Tylee and Jones, 2005; Tanney et al.,
2012; Simmons et al., 2015). As evidenced in many guidelines for
frontline clinical practice, it is taken that education of this order
should then facilitate the resistant patient’s acceptance of their
diagnosis (Petit and Sederer, 2006; Simmons et al., 2015), such
that positive moves forward can be made in terms of treatment
and care.
While intuitive on many levels, given the above, the core
understanding of depression-related diagnostic activity embedded
in this broadly social-cognitive orthodoxy is not unproblematic. A
range of work in the discursive and interactional sciences has, to
date, highlighted how the reduction of any clinical interaction
principally to matters of information transfer and processing
tends to obscure the complex social contexts inhabited by
clinicians and patients, and also the practical social skills of the
interactants (Silverman, 1997; Stivers, 2006; Miller, 2013). Indeed,
it is often acknowledged in clinical directives around depression
diagnosis themselves that factors such as culture, use of language,
ad hoc social skills and personal understandings can play
important roles in frontline medicine (Tylee et al., 1996; Tylee
and Jones, 2005; National Institute for Clinical Excellence, 2016).
In terms of direct clinical research and guidance, however,
attention is rarely accorded to how the particular interpersonal
actions involved in delivering diagnostic news, in resisting (or
not) it and in reaching a subsequent understanding (or not)
are actually “done” in given cases. Consequently, generalizing
explanations for resistance, and recommendations for reaching
resolution, tend to prevail.
Given the above, the core aim of this article is to offer a
Discursive Psychological (henceforth DP, see Edwards, 2012;
Wiggins, 2013; Miller and Benkwitz, 2016; Patterson and Fyson,
2016) perspective on the phenomenon resistance to a depression
diagnosis in frontline clinical work. In the service of this, and
following a review of currently inﬂuential social-cognitive
research on the issue (as typiﬁed in Tylee and Jones, 2005;
Cook and Wang, 2011; Wang et al., 2015; Wimsatt et al., 2015),
and allied clinical guidelines (for example, Petit and Sederer,
2006; National Institute for Clinical Excellence, 2016), the
assumptions and recommendations therein are then explored
with reference to pertinent literature on interaction in healthcare
contexts, and particularly during diagnosis and diagnostic
reception, emerging from research in DP and the closely-related
discipline of Conversation Analysis (henceforth CA, see
Maynard, 2006; Peräkylä, 2006; Miller, 2013; Sikveland et al.,
2016). Key matters are then drawn together in a formal empirical
DP examination of a small but highly illustrative original data set
arising from a wider study of the diagnosis of depression in
United Kingdom (UK) primary care settings. Herein, three
pertinent consultations are examined in which new depression
diagnoses are delivered, and subsequently met with troublesome
receptions from patients—a speciﬁc matter hitherto empirically
unexplored in either the DP or CA domain. By paying particular
attention to the nuanced activities of clinicians and patients during
these consultations, a description is provided of some of the
particular, non-cognitive concerns than can inform and shape
interaction during these “tricky” clinical moments. Not least
among these are matters relating to how patients’ social identities
are coordinatively constituted by speakers as a part of the
interactions themselves (Antaki and Widdicombe, 1998a; Miller
and Benkwitz, 2016) and, most importantly, how ostensive
challenges to the diagnosis itself can be functional devices for a
patient to open up conversational space within the consultation
where these matters might be addressed. All emergent matters are
ﬁnally addressed in terms of a reﬂection on issues relevant for
research and practice around the clinical handling of nominally
difﬁcult topics in general, and the diagnosis of depression in
particular.
Depression, diagnosis and resistance: social cognition and
silver bullets
As noted above, it is well noted in much extant medical research,
and emergent guidelines, that patients will often display a range
of inferably resistant activities following receipt of a depression
diagnosis in primary care (Tylee et al., 1996; Van Voorhees et al.,
2005; Cook and Wang, 2011; Wang et al., 2015; National Institute
for Clinical Excellence, 2016). Alongside a series of analogously
troublesome behaviours surrounding depression in frontline
healthcare1, a patient questioning and/or disputing their
diagnosis in situ, or indeed advancing an outright rejection
thereof, is generally taken to indicate one of two problematic
states of knowledge regarding depression itself. The ﬁrst is a
simple lack of information regarding the complexities of the
condition. Clinical depression, in its most commonly diagnosed
forms, is deﬁned in terms of a constellation of core symptoms
(American Psychiatric Association, 2013), not all of which are—
by any general inference—psychological in character2. Indeed,
directives within the UK’s National Health Service (henceforth
NHS) actively separate these symptoms into psychological,
physical and social domains, as schematised from National
Institute for Clinical Excellence (2016) guidelines in Fig. 1.
While a patient’s report of the more obviously somatic aspects
herein (such as sleep perturbations, fatigue, appetite changes and
so forth) are often sufﬁcient trigger for a clinician to suspect a
case of depression, their co-occurrence is far more likely to lead
that patient to expect a clearly somatic diagnosis (Tylee and
Jones, 2005; Van Voorhees et al., 2005; Wang et al., 2015).
Moreover, patients often interpret (and therefore report) some
depression-relevant psychological states as simple upshots of their
somatic symptoms or social circumstances (Wolpert, 2001; Wang
et al., 2015). To feel low, or enjoy speciﬁc activities less than one
has in the past, for example, when one is constantly fatigued,
struggling at work and/or unable to sleep hardly seems illogical.
Thus, without knowledge of the formal (medical) character of
depression, the act of having simply relayed a set of ostensibly
somatic matters, and in some cases their “natural” psychological
consequences, leads many patients to ﬁnd a diagnosis of
something commonly known to be a mental illness highly
confusing and/or upsetting (Paykel et al., 1997; National Institute
for Clinical Excellence, 2016).
The second explanation given for resistance to a diagnosis of
depression in this body of work relates to a relatively stable
prejudicial belief about depression held by some—a social stigma
(Corrigan and O'Shaughnessy, 2007; Cook and Wang, 2011).
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Wolpert (2001, p.223) famously describes the outputs of this
nominal stigma thusly:
The shame and stigma associated with depression can
prevent those with the illness admitting they are ill … .
There is also the stigma of taking antidepressant medica-
tion which is perceived as mind altering and addictive.
Stigma may also cause somatic symptoms as it is more
acceptable to talk of stomach ache and fatigue than mental
problems.
So rather than simply having a lack of knowledge, these
individuals are subject to an entrenched version of the wrong
knowledge. Within current clinically oriented research, this order
of understanding, particularly prevalent among older adults
(Connery and Davidson, 2006), is generally taken to be itself
based on internalized information relating to depression, and to
depressed people, which is (a) negative, (b) factually-limited and/
or distorted, and (c) globalizing (Tanney et al., 2012; Simmons
et al., 2015; Wimsatt et al., 2015). To this extent, clinical
guidelines in the United Kingdom actively acknowledge obstacles
that healthcare practitioners may encounter when diagnosing or
treating a patient with depression, cautioning that General
Practitioners (henceforth GPs) in particular should “…be aware
that stigma and discrimination can be associated with a diagnosis
of depression.” (National Institute for Clinical Excellence, 2016,
p. 11).
Whatever the proposed social and/or psychological root of a
patient’s resistance to a depression diagnosis might be, however,
the general solution remains the same in all such accounts: the
best way to overcome resistance is to propositionally inform the
patient of the true character of their condition, that is, to
demonstrate that it is a genuine medical disorder, like any other
(Barney et al., 2011; Grifﬁths and Crisp, 2013). This model is
schematised in Fig. 2.
The essential value of providing the general public—in person
or otherwise—with a clear account of current medical knowledge
is both a laudable and essential goal, particularly in a climate
where social and “alternative” media can facilitate the rapid
spread of prospectively dangerous disinformation about medicine
(Rosselli et al., 2016). This aspect of the broad framework
addressed above is in no way disputed herein. Rather, deemed as
problematic are two of the assumptions that underpin the
explanatory character of the model detailed above:
(a) That lacking and/or socially-distorted knowledge is the likely
root of behaviours that imply a resistance to (or rejection of)
a depression diagnosis (Nieuwsma and Pepper, 2010; Barney
et al., 2011; Grifﬁths and Crisp, 2013), and;
(b) That furnishing members of the public with more and/or
more accurate information about depression is the clearest
mechanism through which resistance can be overcome, and
positive steps forward taken (Petit and Sederer, 2006;
National Institute for Clinical Excellence, 2016).
Regarding (a), it is widely accepted in much contemporary
healthcare research (including social-cognitive work itself) that
resistance to a medical opinion need not output directly
from issues of knowledge-deﬁcit about the medical matter itself.
Rather, where a diagnosis or piece of advice conﬂicts with a
deeply-held (often religious) conviction, then resistance
can equally be an output of an individual having made an
active choice that—while inferably irrational from a purely
instrumental perspective—cannot be taken to directly evidence a
lacking or distorted understanding of the medical facts
Figure 1 | UK NHS summary of depression symptoms.
Figure 2 | Misunderstanding-education model.
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themselves (Koenig, 2004). Connectedly, and regarding (b),
meanwhile, there is a commonly voiced complaint in public
health literature that individuals being well-informed of a
medical truth and using it as a catalyst for a change in behaviour
seldom square-up as well as they theoretically should
(Gray et al., 2006). For example, full knowledge of the prospective
dangers of smoking is indicated as the primary motivation
for quitting in only a small minority of cases; far more commonly,
it a personally-relevant health event (that is, experience
of a negative health outcome for that individual, or a close friend
or relative) that actually triggers practical action (Gallus
et al., 2013). In this respect, there is limited evidence to suggest
that a transfer of medically correct information, at the broader
public level at least, will inherently determine a positive
response to it.
Despite broader healthcare literature highlighting how con-
tingent concerns at the local and personal levels can be hugely
inﬂuential in an individual’s approach to medical information,
however, the core social-cognitive reliance on a “deﬁcit model”
(McNeil, 2013) of knowledge around depression as an explicatory
mechanism for resistant behaviour remains largely uncontested
within practice-facing research and guidance. This, it is not
unreasonable to suppose, is connected to the status of depression
itself as a “mental illness,” a category of diagnoses that is well-
evidenced to be less well-understood by the general public than
many somatic conditions, and sometimes seen as the medicaliza-
tion of moodiness, irrational behaviour or even laziness (Tylee
and Jones, 2005; Barney et al., 2011; Cook and Wang, 2011). It is
important to note that the prospectively troublesome status of
public knowledge about depression, although widely thought to
have been improving for some time (Pescosolido et al., 2010), is
not at stake in this paper any more than the value of transparent
information. Indeed, it is not proposed herein that the broad
social-cognitive model detailed above might not apply absolutely
in some cases. Rather, it is the contention here the relationship
between evidence and inference should be considered in
particular, rather than general, circumstances. A set of observa-
tions emerging from the traditions of DP and CA regarding
interpersonal action in direct clinical contexts themselves (Antaki
et al., 2007c; Finlay et al., 2008; Miller, 2013), particularly those
relevant to the practical business of giving and receiving diagnosis
(Frankel, 2001; Maynard, 2004; Peräkylä, 2006; Ijäs-Kallio et al.,
2012), give us cause to reﬂect upon the complex issues that might
be indicated within any speciﬁc case of diagnosis/resistance, as
outlined below.
DP, CA and discursive action
Herein, ﬁndings emerging from studies in DP and CA are
addressed as generally compatible, given that they both address
language-use as a concurrently constructed and constructive
medium (Potter and Hepburn, 2005), the character of which is
not reducible to what speakers “think,” but is situationally
accomplished with reference to how they infer it will be heard
within speciﬁc sequences of talk (Miller and Grimwood, 2015).
For the purposes of this section, such a stance is relatively
unproblematic. It is important, however, to be mindful that while
both approaches are ultimately rooted in Harvey Sacks’ original
lectures on conversational forms, ﬁrst delivered in the 1960s
(Sacks, 1992a, b), CA has remained a relatively consistent
approach since this foundation, while DP has a more differ-
entiated character. Accounts of the speciﬁc convergence and
divergence within and between the disciplines are available in a
number of sources (for example, Woofﬁtt, 2005; Miller, 2012)
but, as Wiggins (2017, 37) highlights, the most signiﬁcant point of
difference is that while:
…CA is primarily focused on the social organisation of talk
and how people make sense of each other in interaction,
DP has an explicitly constructionist focus. That is, DP is
concerned with the way in which categories are produced
and performed in discourse; with the versions of reality
that are invoked and made available for social and
psychological actions. So, while CA might examine how
talk is socially organised, DP would examine how this
particular version of talk is socially organised. [Original
emphasis]
Pertinent ﬁndings from the two traditions are reviewed here,
thus, with respect to their implications for an understanding of
talk within diagnosis, and broader talk around mental illness
categories, to illuminate the speciﬁc matter at hand.
Diagnosis, discourse and social identity. Diagnosis is, from any
point of view, something that generally is “done” by one indivi-
dual to another; the bearer of the diagnostic news (a GP, radio-
grapher, oncologist and so forth) will, in effect, be ascribing new
attributes to the social identity of their patient at the local level
(Maynard, 2004; Miller, 2013). Within the social-cognitive tra-
dition, this process is taken to be an essentially stable one
(Tucker, 2009). Where a diagnosis of depression is made, for
example, its known implications for the patient’s identity become
correctly or incorrectly cognitively placed by the patient, and
generally serve as logical drivers of subsequent activity. So, a
patient misunderstanding of the character of depression (as the
wrong thing, or just a universally bad thing) tends to result in
resistant behaviour (Grifﬁths and Crisp, 2013; Simmons et al.,
2015; Wang et al., 2015). Should they cognitively place depression
as a “real illness” rather than embarrassing/stigmatised state, and/
or the right thing with which to be diagnosed given the symptoms
reported, on the other hand, they will likely accept the diagnosis
without caveat (Cook and Wang, 2011).
This approach to the relationship between knowledge and
action in context is, on many levels, highly intuitive. A wealth of
work in the interactional sciences has, however, demonstrated
how individuals in practical discursive circumstances, including
clinicians and patients, tend to manage matters of social identity
in ways that do not easily reduce to matters of cognition
(Widdicombe and Woofﬁtt, 1995; Heritage and Robinson, 2006;
Wiggins, 2009; Miller and Benkwitz, 2016). Take, for example, the
baseline business of delivering a diagnosis. Clinicians can rarely
be seen to simply announce a diagnosis as transparent “news” to
be ingested, following a process of objective symptom analysis.
Rather, the material of the diagnosis is itself generally and
observably framed with sensitivity to prior activity within the
consultation, and the inferred impact it might have upon the
patient’s sense of immediate self (Stivers, 2006). With reference to
this, Silverman (1997) and Peräkylä (2006) highlight that the way
in which a news-delivery sequence in clinical practice is
formulated as “good” or “bad” largely proceeds from a situated
assessment of the patient’s contextual expectations. Where
diagnostic news is anticipated to be taken badly, speciﬁc
communicative strategies are used to soften the blow, not least
among which is the use of “expressive caution” (Silverman, 1997)
—a set of interpersonal techniques including a hesitant approach,
lowered voice, and stretched-out delivery involving a pre-
diagnostic raft of reassurances regarding how the physical and
social impacts of the (as yet undelivered) news is not necessarily a
worst-case-scenario. These simultaneously preclude the diagnosis
being heard as a “shock,” via pre-preparing the patient for the
prospect of bad news, while also making available that the
clinician understands the matter is indeed sensitive (local
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empathy). Where the clinician’s assessment of the interactional
context aligns with that of the patient, and actions proceed in this
way, then news is generally received amicably (if not necessarily
cheerfully) by that patient. If misjudged, however, this order of
interpersonal approach can actually engender the exact inter-
personal difﬁculty it was designed to avoid (McLeod, 1994; Miller
et al., 2017); in short, the patient can take the clinician’s act of
treating an issue cautiously as being implicative of the news itself
as something shameful. The reverse is also true. Where the
clinician directly and unproblematically addresses matters that
the patient actually ﬁnds contextually sensitive, the latter will
often withdraw from the interaction, withholding cooperation
and/or rejecting advice (Silverman, 1997). Thus, the sensitivity of
an issue or topic in medical interaction is to some extent “…
constituted by the very act of talking about it cautiously and
discreetly.” (Bergmann, 1992, 154). As Goffman (1963) famously
notes, social stigma is not something that necessarily pre-exists a
context; rather it can also emerge as a consequence of matters
therein being handled as stigmatised (or not) within the to-and-
fro of meaningful interaction3.
At a more directly sequential level, and as Maynard (1997,
2004) comprehensively explores, clinicians will often work over a
series of questions and answers so as to infer a patient’s stance
on how given news might be taken before they deliver it. Such
perspective-display sequences4 provide the clinician with
contextual resources from which to infer whether (or not) a
softening of the form of the news itself, or a mitigation of the
stated consequences, might be necessary to avoid a difﬁcult
response from the patient. Perhaps more importantly, however, it
also allows for a clinician to co-implicate the patient into the
diagnostic formulation, incorporating their own assertions (or
even exact words). In doing so, the patient’s agency within the
immediate context is foregrounded (Maynard, 2004); a local case
is made for how the diagnosis is a direct upshot of the patient’s
own interactional work, and accountability for the material of the
diagnosis is thereby shared between both participants. In these
circumstances, acceptant (concordant) responses are very often
engendered, even when the news itself is by any account “bad”.
This indicates that local issues around social identity (that is,
the impact of identity ascriptions within the immediate contexts
of their ascription) often appear to be of greater concern to
clinicians and patients alike than the global cognitive impacts of
someone becoming known as, for example, depressed. While the
use of perspective display (or expressive caution) within a
consultation can make little inherent difference to the wider social
circumstances of the patient ultimately being known to “have”
any given condition, the precise manner of diagnostic formula-
tion remains inferred by practitioners to be a critical element of
patient-management in situ (Potter and Hepburn, 2005; Antaki
et al., 2007a; Goicoechea, 2013; Miller et al., 2017). Were this not
the case, then it would be largely unnecessary for a clinician to
address news-delivery with reference to its local import, nor
would this likely have any meaningful impact upon the manner in
which patients receive their diagnoses.
Although this is possibly counter-intuitive within cogntive
psychology, work on social interaction across a range of contexts
has demonstrated how individuals often shape their activity ﬁrst
and foremost with respect to local issues of “face” (Goffman,
2003) and immediate social credibility (Miller and Grimwood,
2015). A broad range of work on medical interaction (Speer and
Parsons, 2007; Antaki, 2008; Goicoechea, 2013) has robustly
demonstrated that patients in a range of healthcare settings
pervasively attend primarily to local interactional concerns rather
than notional knowledge-structures, or easily deﬁned social
positions. In a study of upper respiratory tract infections for
example, Ijäs-Kallio et al. (2012), in line with the work of
Maynard (2004), highlight how apparent comfort or discomfort
with diagnosis among the patients in their corpus (the latter
expressed in questioning or challenging the clinician’s opinion,
that is, “non-concordance”) has little to do with those patients’
propositional understandings of the diagnosed condition, but is
usually an outcome of the degree to which they can interpret the
GP’s diagnosis itself as following logically from the sequential
unfolding of questions asked and the answers given during that
speciﬁc interaction. In short, the formatting of the consultation
itself needs to conﬁrm that the patient is a full participant in its
outcome; i.e. cooperation from the patient is broadly contingent
upon a locally-generated sense of their own identity as fully
agential. Similarly, Miller (2013) illustrates how GPs in primary
care, when trying to establish if a patient has suicidal or self-
harming ideation, need to direct a careful series of questions (each
contingent upon the given answers) that gradually align the
patient’s local social identity with that of someone who “might
perfectly reasonably think that way.” Where the patient’s identity
is successfully aligned in this manner, and despite the apparently
thorny topic, a question about suicidal ideation is answered
(positively or negatively) without problem. Where it is not, and
the question appears sequentially out-of-place, the patient then
withdraws cooperation within the consultation. Here, cooperation
is contingent upon a local sense of the patient’s identity being
both agential and rational.
This latter work, in particular, gives us cause to reﬂect not only
upon the speciﬁc business of diagnostic news-delivery, but also
upon broader issues arising from ascribing a “mental” illness as
an attribute of an individual’s identity. Much of the clinically
oriented literature previously reviewed proceeds from a central
assumption that diagnoses such as depression are more
inherently difﬁcult for patients to accept in situ than those of
more obviously somatic conditions, as they are less well
understood and/or more subject to social stigma (Wolpert,
2001; Barney et al., 2011; Grifﬁths and Crisp, 2013; Wang et al.,
2015). There is a wealth of well-cited research in the CA and DP
domains that addresses interaction in which a mental illness
category is announced, applied or implied (Antaki et al., 2007a, b;
Finlay et al., 2008; Horne and Wiggins, 2009; Tucker, 2009). Like
the work on diagnostic interaction discussed above, this body of
literature does not dismiss the inﬂuence of broader knowledges
relating to the illness categories themselves, but rather highlights
how the manner in which knowledges are themselves actively
addressed tends to arise initially in terms of their local (rather
than global) consequences.
Horne and Wiggins (2009), for example, in a study of online
suicide support forums, intricately demonstrate the difﬁculties
experienced by individuals in getting their own suicidal ideation
taken seriously in a context where others are making (and
therefore usually evaluating) similar claims. Rather than simply
and neutrally providing an account of how they think or feel,
thus, members of the chat-groups remain demonstrably sensitive
to local inferential concerns around how their own claims might
be read (and their local social identity thus interpreted). Foremost
among these is the matter that if one is:
…not suicidal enough and you may be treated as ‘just’
depressed; ‘too’ suicidal and it may be challenged if you do not
carry through your actions. (Horne and Wiggins, 2009: 170)
In a broader DP study of schizophrenia, meanwhile, Tucker
(2009) explores how individuals who have been diagnosed with
the condition subsequently make sense of their diagnosis. The
emergent ﬁndings highlight how the concerns of the speciﬁc
individuals regarding schizophrenia, in terms of how they are
relayed during an interview, are similar to those arising within
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Miller’s (2013) study of questioning around suicidal inclination.
Effectively, so long as the (respectively) interviewer or GP handles
their co-interlocutor’s own activity as a full and rational
contribution to the design of questions and reaching of
conclusions, then the apparent stigma of the matter often goes
almost unrecognized. This does not mean, once again, that the
emergent category does not potentially carry social “weight”.
Rather, that the implications of categorization are best ﬁrstly
explored in terms of their immediate import for the face-to-face
context itself.
The extant body of interactional research detailed above
indicates, above all, that the concerns of patients in clinical
interactions stem primarily from their interest in being (at the
very least) constituted as capable participants in the local
interaction where otherwise they might be seen as passive
recipients of institutional labels, particularly where given
diagnosis/advice implies an inferably mental illness (Antaki,
2007; Antaki et al., 2007c; Finlay et al., 2008; Miller, 2013). In the
speciﬁc terms of depression diagnosis, then, we might expect that
practitioners and patients alike might be empirically seen to
orient to how the categorization of the latter might affect the
particular interaction (Peräkylä, 1998; Antaki et al., 2007b;
Miller, 2013). This is (once again) not to propose that no patients,
during clinical interaction in primary care, can behave on the
basis of the incomplete or globalizing ideas about depression
proposed in the conventional social-cognitive model outlined
above (Van Voorhees et al., 2005, 2006; Cook and Wang, 2011;
Wang et al., 2015). Rather, it is the contention here that the active
manner in which depression is diagnosed by a medical
professional, and the way in which this diagnosis is received
and then handled, might ﬁrstly be explored in terms of the micro-
dynamics of empirically available evidence, and with respect to
the concerns of the individuals involved.
The DP and CA materials above, then, regarding the practical
business of giving and receiving diagnoses in clinical contexts,
and talking about mental illness categories across a range of
contexts, render relevant three key research questions regarding
the data-set reported below, speciﬁcally addressing what are
conventionally deemed “troublesome” receptions5 of a new
depression diagnosis in primary care (that is, those where the
patient actively challenges the medical opinion given, see Cook
and Wang, 2011):
1. How do the clinicians formulate a new depression diagnosis,
and with reference to what prior patient activity?
2. What order of activity does the patient’s resistance make
relevant from the clinician?
3. How is concordance reached, or not reached, and as a
consequence of what, in each case?
Methods
The following analytic sections employ the contemporary interactional-sequence
model of DP approach advocated by Wiggins (2017), and as executed in line with
the work of Miller and Benkwitz (2016) and Patterson and Fyson (2016). Ideally,
the core epistemology of the approach, a non-cognitive empirical stance on social
interaction, is largely evident in the discussion of pertinent research advanced
above, though a more formal ontological statement on the position can be found,
however, in Potter (2010)6. DP was chosen over CA as the core approach, given the
focus on interaction about a speciﬁc issue (depression/resistance), rather upon the
broader nature of clinical interaction itself (Woofﬁtt, 2005; Wiggins, 2017). In the
service of this investigation, the data addressed, in the form of recorded doctor-
patient primary care consultations, were collected exclusively in UK primary care
settings. Analytic focus herein falls, and as noted, speciﬁcally upon a speciﬁc
consultations where a patient either contests or questions a diagnosis of depression
immediately after that diagnosis is delivered, actions characteristically deﬁned as
“resistance” in contemporary clinical literature (Van Voorhees et al., 2005; Wang
et al., 2015; National Institute for Clinical Excellence, 2016).
Ethical considerations. With full approval from the pertinent NHS ethics com-
mittee, all patients at participating surgeries across the duration of the data col-
lection period were asked if they might permit their consultations to be audio-
recorded, such that they might work with a research project about potentially
improving doctor-patient communication. In this way, new depression diagnoses
could be captured, and recordings not relevant to the purposes of the project could
be deleted securely at source. Recordings were collected (and, where relevant,
deleted) by the GPs themselves, with no researchers present, to minimize disrup-
tion to the medical process.
Before initially signing the consent form, participants were advised of the steps
to preserve their anonymity (that is, that all dates, places and names would be
removed from transcripts, and that no details of the location or timing of the
broader project would be made publicly available), and were also made aware that
there would be a further 2 week “cooling-off” period subsequent to their
consultation, during which they could withdraw their contribution if they saw ﬁt.
Participants. Across the data collection period, N= 15 new diagnoses of depres-
sion were collected, and recordings of the full consultations in which they arose
were then returned. Within this corpus, nominally unproblematic transitions
between diagnostic delivery and talk-about-treatment were not a universal feature.
Instead, in a ﬁfth of cases (N= 3), the patient raised issues about the diagnosis itself
that prompted the GP to engage in a visible (re)negotiation of what depression is,
means or implies, until some form of concordance was ﬁnally reached.
Analysis. All data were subject to multiple hearings to transcription; transcription
itself was then executed using full Jeffersonian conventions (see Hepburn and
Bolden, 2013, and Box 1). Analysis proceeded in line with the systematic principles
outlined in exacting detail by Wiggins (2017), regarding how conversational data
should be interpreted within the DP tradition. The core aspects of these are
summarized by Miller and Benkwitz (2016, 43):
Firstly, any example of spoken discourse is concurrently a constructed
phenomenon, and a constructive one. Secondly, talk is itself action-
oriented. It is used in the service of a variety of interpersonal activities…
Thirdly, talk is always situated. It is produced and understood according to
its position within a broader sequence of discourse.
Throughout the following analyses below, speciﬁc sections of talk are located
using a notation that indexes the extract and line; thus, [E2/L6] indicates
something said in extract 2, line 6. Also, therein, “Dx” designates the GP and
extract number (x) and “Px” the patient and extract number (x).
Findings and Discussion
Consider now E1, in which the following activity is visible:
1. A diagnosis of depression is delivered by the GP;
2. That diagnosis is directly questioned/challenged by the patient;
3. A period of negotiation around the meaning and or
implications of the diagnosis ensues;
4. A concordance on the veracity of the original diagnosis is
reached;
5. The consultation proceeds to a discussion of treatment.
Extract 1
[P1 has previously discussed feeling low, exhausted and “empty”. Immedi-
ately before this extract, D asked P if he has ever felt low enough to harm
himself. P has politely but ﬁrmly denied this.]
1. D1: okay (.) right (.) then
2. (1.0)
3. we:ll (.) ºahmº (.) I don think is: anything se::rious
4. (0.5).hhh (0.5)
5. looking at what you’ve sa::id (.) the most likely cause is (.)
6. (1.0)
7. ºahmº maybe (.) a little depression
8. (.5)
9. P1: e::rm?
10. (1.5)
11. D1: ye:s (.) a little bit of a depression there (.) I ºthinkº
12. (.5)
13. P1: oh (.) yeah? (.) spose it ºmighº (.) but (.5)
14. ya ºumº sure? (.)
15. snot like ahm (.5) ºlikeº suicidal or anythin like ah said (1.0)
16. jus: a bit (.) ya know (.) run down
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17. (1.5)
18. D1: ya::h (.) a lot of people do think that (.) ahm: (.) depression is just
about
19. feeling really down and hopeless (.5) an a lot of the (.) time yes it is
(.)
20. but ah: (.) ºwellº (.5) not a:lways
21. (1.5)
22. P1: uhuh?=
23. D1: = no (.5) you might just feel ahm (.) run down for a long time (.)
24. or low and just not well (.) like you said
25. (1.5)
26. P1: ºri:ghº
27. (.5)
28. D1: and I think the best explanation here is a:: little bit of depression
29. (1.0)
30. P1: right (.) ukay ((consultation continues to discussion of treatment
options))
The immediate pre-diagnostic turns, in this case7, do not
evidence any of “scoping” work by the D1 consistent with that
described by Maynard (1991, 1997); rather, diagnostic
questioning segues directly into diagnostic delivery. Of
particular interest here, however, is the formatting of the
diagnosis itself [E1/L1-7]. Note how the diagnostic news is
delayed within the turn, mitigated (as “not serious”), and the talk
itself is subject to a discernible series of hesitations. Such
dispreferred action turn-shapes (Sacks, 1992b, p. 414), when
produced in everyday talk, typically demonstrate an orientation
by the speaker to the possibility that the news they are about to
break (or question they are about to ask) may not be well-received
by their co-interlocutor. Moreover, and as noted above, expressive
caution in medical news-delivery sequences often heard by a
patient as foreshadowing of a “difﬁcult” disclosure (Silverman,
1997; Miller, 2013). Given this interactional property, tentatively
formulated diagnoses can therefore be actively used by a doctor to
forearm the patient for this very outcome, at a point where the
consultation might normally proceed directly to a discussion of
treatment options (ten Have, 1995; Peräkylä, 2006). In short,
framing the diagnosis here as uncertain (or hesitant):
(a) Is indicative of D1 anticipating that there are insufﬁcient
contextually-available resources to suggest that the patient
will ﬁnd the diagnosis unproblematic, and;
(b) Opens up space for P1 to ask questions about a “delicate”
diagnosis in a way that framing it as an incontrovertible fact
does not. Regarding the former, the P1 can reasonably initiate
dialogue about the doctor’s opinion. With respect to the
latter, anything other than an agreement would likely be
hearable as a direct challenge to D1’s contextual authority,
with potentially damaging consequences for “social solidar-
ity” (Silverman, 1997) within the consultation itself.
So, in this case at least, we might see the patient’s ostensibly
resistant activity to their diagnosis of depression as to some extent
an invited phenomenon, rather than direct evidence of an
inherently “negative attitude,” or incomplete/distorted knowledge.
Equally noteworthy here is the manner in which the initial
uptake on the diagnosis is accomplished by P1. No immediate
contest is provided, but rather a minimal utterance in E1/L9
(“erm?”) is the ﬁrst response. As Heath (1992) observes, a very
common way in which a patient can signal unproblematic
accordance with the diagnosis provided is via a silence or
“marked acknowledgement”8 (Heritage and Seﬁ, 1992) in the ﬁrst
available turn thereafter, thereby displaying (or at least implying)
agreement with, or deference to, its validity.
By withholding response, patients not only provide the
doctor with the opportunity of developing the consultation
as they so wish, but preserve the objective, scientiﬁc, and
professional status of the diagnosis or medical assessment;
the silence or acknowledgement operating retroactively to
underscore the signiﬁcance of the practitioner’s opinion of
the condition. (Heath, 1992, 262)
However, neither silence, nor marked acknowledgement, is the
outcome of the ﬁrst turn after the diagnosis here; rather a
minimal utterance is used by the patient in E1/L9 (“erm?”) which
ultimately leads to a series of negotiations about the diagnosis
itself. Heritage (1984) similarly demonstrates how the production
of this order of particle routinely projects further talk on the part
Box 1: Jeffersonian transcription notation
(.5) The number in brackets indicates a time gap in seconds (that is, in this instance, ﬁve tenths).
(.) A dot enclosed in brackets indicates a pause in the talk of less than two tenths of a second.
·hh A dot before an “h” indicates an in-breath by the speaker. More h’s indicate a longer breath.
hh An “h” indicates an out-breath. More h’s indicate a longer breath.
(( )) A description enclosed in double brackets indicates a non-verbal activity.
- A dash indicates a sharp cut off of the prior word or sound.
: Colons indicate that the speaker has drawn out the preceding sound or letter. More colons indicate a greater degree of “stretching” of the
sound.
( ) Empty brackets indicate the presence of an unclear fragment in the recording.
(guess) The words within a single bracket indicate the transcriber’s best guess at an unclear fragment.
. A full stop indicates a stopping fall in tone, not necessarily the end of a sentence.
, A comma indicates a continuing intonation.
? A question mark indicates a rising inﬂection, not necessarily a question.
* An asterisk indicates a “croaky” pronunciation of the immediately following section.
↑↓ “Up” and “Down” arrows represent a rising or falling intonation, respectively.
CAPITALS With the exception of proper nouns, capital letters indicate a section of speech louder than that surrounding it.
º º Degree markers indicate that the talk they encompass was noticeably quieter than that surrounding it.
underline Indicates speaker emphasis
Thaght A “gh” indicates a guttural pronunciation in the word.
4 o “More than” and “less than” signs indicate that the section of talk they encompass was noticeably quicker than surrounding talk.
= “Equals” indicates contiguous utterances.
[ Square brackets between adjacent lines of concurrent speech indicate the onset and end of a spate of overlapping talk.
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of the producer; a freestanding “oh” (like an “erm”) can, for
example, be both used (and heard) as an indicator of “with-
holding” an issue, or a reluctance to elaborate it. Moreover, and as
clearly evident in E1/L11, it often precipitates further work from
the co-interlocutor in terms of clariﬁcation. This activity is
similarly present in extract 2:
Extract 2
[P2 has previously complained of struggling to concentrate and socialize, and
made particularly relevant the difﬁculties that this is causing in his university
life and studies.]
1. D2: right (.5) then (.) ahm (.5)
2. what you have is: (.) ahm (.) I’d say (.) a pretty mild case of
depress:ion=
3. P2: = o:
h
4. D2: yes?
5. (1.0)
6. P2: snuthing rea::lly (.5) jus: (.) um
7. (.5)
8. D2: yes?
9. P2: well (.) it’s jus that my sister was (.) ahh. she got told she was
depressed by
10. her doctor down at [CONFIDENTIAL] university but she
used to ring up and (.) well (.) not
11. say anythin (.5) sit there in silence or (.) she:d burst into
tears for no reason
12. (.) and keep saying that she was gonna (.) you know (.) hurt
herself and
13. .hhhh
14. (1.0)
15. D2: ºmmmº
16. P2: well (.) I’m not like that
17. (.5)
18. D2: no (.) not at all (.) that sounds like quite a (.) a severe case of
depression to
19. me (.5) your symptoms are better described as mild (.) I
mean (.) you’re lucid
20. but (.) just struggling a bit (.) really
21. (1.0)
22. yeah (.) alright ((continues))
Herein, the material of the diagnosis is not only marked by D2
as “delicate” through mechanisms highly comparable to those
noted above, but D2’s own activity, like that of D1, explicitly co-
opts P2 and P1 respectively [E1/L5; E2/L2] into the outcomes. As
such, and as outlined above, co-accountability for the diagnosis
itself is embedded within the diagnostic turn; conversantly, P2
uses the “oh” particle (Heritage, 1984) to open up conversational
space in the way that P1 used “erm.” From a DP perspective,
however, it is the subsequent activity in both cases that is of
signiﬁcant import.
Ultimately, in the cases above, whether either patient was
indeed psychologically predisposed to object to the diagnosis of
depression or not, the cautious formatting of the diagnostic turn
provides them both with (a) a reason to question or challenge it
(that is, the GP has himself treated the diagnosis as a “sensitive”
one) and (b) an opportunity to do so. In both extracts so far
explored, this is then exactly what proceeds to occur. Rather than
volunteer the explicit assent or dissent which is now conditionally
relevant, for example, P2 makes available further reluctance to
produce it at all, downgrading its importance with the claim that
the issue being withheld is “nothing really” [E2/L6]. While this
ultimately constitutes a weak acceptance of the diagnosis, at best,
it serves an important moral function within this interaction. As a
number of studies have described, active resistance to a diagnosis
is relatively unusual in any form (Frankel, 1984; Heath, 1992;
Peräkylä, 1998, 2006). Indeed, for P2 to explicitly contradict D2’s
judgment in this case would run a range of local, contextual risks,
not least in providing for an interpretation of his own character as
that of an unreasonable, disruptive or aggressive person (Miller,
2013). By displaying a hearable deference to proper conduct in
the consultation via the overt restraint of the turn, P2 works to
uphold D2’s contextual authority and, reﬂexively, negate
inferential damage to his own identity. In E2/L8, D2 then issues
a further encouragement token and P2 ﬁnally produces an
autobiographical account as further evidence of such deference, as
a dutiful (yet reluctant) response to D2’s second request. P2
thereby distributes accountability for its production between both
speakers. This mirrors the activity in E1/L16-17 very closely;
herein, P1 also ﬁnds an initial means of calling the diagnosis into
question without directly contradicting D1.
Being depressed and being “ordinary” as primary concerns in
initial non-concordance. It is particularly noteworthy that in
both cases above, the patients’ subsequent diagnosis-related dis-
course not only makes relevant further explanatory action from
the GPs, but also concurrently provides a warrant for the patients
having not simply agreed with the diagnosis in the ﬁrst place. In
E1/L13-16, P1—while markedly acknowledging the potential
veracity of the depression diagnosis—provides a framework for
an alternative reading of the symptoms he has previously made
relevant (that is, he is “just a little run down”—itself a reformu-
lation of D1’s own diagnostic turn). This is grounded by aligning
depressed persons with persons who are potentially “suicidal”
[E1/L15], and then disassociating himself from suicidal activity.
In E2/L9-12, meanwhile, P2 ventures an autobiographical account
through which to problematize the diagnosis, directly contrasting
his sister’s experience of depression with his own:
well (.) it’s jus that my sister was (.) ahh. she got told she
was depressed by her doctor down at CONFIDENTIAL
university but she used to ring up and (.) well (.) not say
anythin (.5) sit there in silence or (.) she:d burst into tears
for no reason (.) and keep saying that she was gonna (.) you
know (.) hurt herself and.hhhh … well (.) I’m not like that
In both cases, adopting a social-cognitive stance, we could
potentially propose that activity of this order exposes false beliefs
around the character of depression itself; to be considered
depressed, one must have some fairly extreme symptoms
(respectively suicidal ideation or self-harming threats) and, where
these symptoms are not present, the patient might not be
considered depressed. We might also propose, with particular
reference to E2, that this false belief is rooted in unpleasant
personal experience with a family member. Notwithstanding the
fact that individuals who have personal experience of depression
(ﬁrst- or second- hand) tend to understand more about the
condition itself, not less (Link et al., 1999), it is observable that
P2’s account is ﬁnely constructed to achieve this sharp contrast
between his sister’s condition and his own.
Firstly, the protagonist in P2’s narrative is explicitly identiﬁed
in terms of a familial category; she is P2’s sister. As with all
mobilized social identity categories, the speciﬁc selection
demonstrably attends to inferential concerns arising from
account itself (Antaki and Widdicombe, 1998b; Antaki et al.,
2007b; Miller and Benkwitz, 2016). In this case, a sister is
somebody about whom the speaker has rights to possess reliable
information, and to be concerned. Secondly, the contextual
relevance of the story is established; his sister was told she was
depressed by a doctor, just as P2 has been. Her identity as
university student is also occasioned, which makes further
available a number of inferences pertaining to her general age,
level of intelligence, lifestyle and so forth. Moreover, since P2’s
own student identity has itself been a salient topic throughout the
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consultation, he makes relevant a further equivalence between his
case and that of his sister. In E2/L10, however, the speciﬁc
description of his sister’s depressed behaviour is prefaced with the
contrast marker “but.” In this way, D2 is furnished with resources
from which to infer that this is where the similarities between the
two cases end.
The important point here is that the account is not just an
account of irrational or unusual behaviour, but is organized to
accomplish this exact character (see Smith, 1978). Firstly, “not
saying anything”, upgraded to “sitting in silence,” is not, in itself,
particularly bizarre. Indeed, in many contexts such behaviour
would be decidedly appropriate. In this account, however, the
action is located within the broader context of having “rung up,”
and actually being the caller makes relevant the obligation of
having something to say. While people may (and do) regularly
call to say nothing of substance, “normal” people do not generally
ring up to say nothing at all. Similarly, crying is not in itself a
particularly unusual activity. Note, however, the construction
here: “bursting into tears.” This is a rather more abrupt
formulation than, say, “starting to cry.” The behaviour is framed
as an uncontrolled one for which, P2 explicitly claims, there was
“no reason.” All emotion displays or claims are, however, subject
to situated entitlements (Edwards, 1999). For a strong emotional
reaction such as “bursting into tears” to be heard as normal, a
proportionate stressor needs to be discerned. By stripping his
sister’s behaviour not only of an appropriate reason, but of any
reason at all, P2 discursively disaligns it entirely with activity
which is “ordinary”, reasonable or rational.
The ﬁnal part of the account, meanwhile, emphasizes the more
explicitly persistent character of a more hearably dangerous
behaviour; the sister would “keep saying” that she would
hurt herself [E2/L12]. This utterance serves to discursively embed
self-harming intent (or an active ideation, at the very least)
in the general sense of depression being worked-up here and,
reﬂexively, to mark an implicit point of contrast between P2’s
own case and that of his sibling. In this account, his sister makes
(a) active, (b) repeated and (c) unambiguous threats regarding
self-harm.
In E2/L9-12, thus, P2 produces a factual account which, in its
entirety, makes available a particular understanding of the
character of depression itself, grounded in the details of his
own concrete personal experience. He then marks the whole
narrative as “not like” his own behaviour [E2/L16]. This marks an
explicit, situated disalignment between himself and his
(depressed) sister, thereby making available an inferable asym-
metry between his own symptoms and depression itself. As such
his resistance to the diagnosis is achieved indirectly, circumvent-
ing any hearably direct challenge to D2’s authority as diagnosis-
provider. To these ends, P2 mitigates this ﬁnal claim by
producing a body of evidence for making that very claim.
Moreover, and embedded in this activity, is some complex,
situated identity-achievement; P2 works consistently to construct
an ordinary, everyday and “rational” identity for himself.
He organizes his account so as to emphasize its factuality and
relevance, constructs his argument a logical deduction
and, by working-up the sheer irrationality of his sister’s behaviour
within the account, provides D2 with a contrast-framework
from which P2 can be judged as very normal by comparison.
Moreover, he does all this while sidestepping any direct
challenges to D2’s authority, and upholds the local social
solidarity throughout. In this respect he does what Harvey
Sacks (1984) famously terms “being ordinary”. He orients the
listener to the everydayness of his own actions, character and
reasoning process and also avoids any activity that could
potentially seem contextually unusual or irrational (such as
directly challenging a GP’s opinion during a consultation,
and so forth).
In the light of this, it is also possible to reﬂect upon the activity
of P1 in E1/L13-16, who appears to request that D1 consider an
alternative candidate diagnosis: that he is just “a bit run down.”
Rather than take his apparent conﬂation of depression and
suicide as a transparent representation of a false belief about
depression (likely stigma-related), we might instead consider this
a similar contrast-formulation that encourages a view of P1 as
relatively normal in the circumstances. In short, it is another
exercise in doing “being ordinary”.
“Rational” identity in action. Thus far it has been demonstrated,
in both E1 and E2, that the diagnostic turns and the immediate
receptions thereof are clearly sensitive to a range of prospective
inferences regarding the patients’ social identities, not least those
pertaining to the patients’ states of mind (Horne and Wiggins,
2009; Tucker, 2009; Antaki, 2013), that a diagnosis of depression
can make situationally relevant:
1. The formatting of the diagnostic turns constitute depression as
a “delicate” object within the consultations, but also open up
space for patient-initiated questions.
2. The patients, using a variety of techniques, employ this
discursive space to assert the ordinariness of their cases in
comparison to some more extreme formulations of what
depression “might be.”
3. They achieve (2) without making direct challenges to the local
authority of the GPs, thereby preserving the core orderliness of
the consultation itself.
These coordinative activities, thus, provide cause to consider
that the post-diagnosis activities of P1 and P2 do not
transparently represent any form of attempt to resist, obstruct
or alter their diagnoses at all. Rather, by doing what they do in the
way that they do it, the patients carefully open up further
discursive spaces within their respective consultations that might
not otherwise have been available (Peräkylä, 2006; Ijäs-Kallio
et al., 2012), such that the local implications of that diagnosis
might be further addressed. In short, they invite the physicians to
collaborate in afﬁrming the ordinary identities proposed within
their ostensibly non-concordant activity. In both cases, this is
precisely what is forthcoming in the GPs’ responses to the
patients’ concerns [E1/L18-28; E2/L18-20], and the consultations
subsequently progress unproblematically to discussions of treat-
ment options. At the core of each is an explicit acknowledgement
of how everyday the patient’s case own (and thereby social
identity) apparently is; the patient is locally constituted as a
normal person with depression, rather than a depressed person
(ten Have, 1995; Miller, 2013). In E1, this involves D1 recognizing
(and echoing) the correctness of P1’s own analysis; that he does
just indeed seem “low” and “run down”. In E2, D2 does this by
implicitly and explicitly recognizing P2’s own agency and
lucidity; this demonstrates an acute sensitivity on the part of
D2 to both the contextual implications of the diagnosis itself,
and also to those of P2’s story about his sister. In neither of these
cases does the GP’s interactional work in establishing con-
cordance lend to an easy interpretation of the data as evidencing
an attempt to “educate” the patient, as is typically proposed
within contemporary clinical guidance (Petit and Sederer, 2006;
National Institute for Clinical Excellence, 2016). Propositional
education is, by any common-sense deﬁnition, premised in part
on the effective transfer of novel information to correct
incomplete or distorted knowledge. Consider, however, the
relevant turns in E1 [L18-28].
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18. D1: ya::h (.) a lot of people do think that (.) ahm: (.) depression is just
about
19. feeling really down and hopeless (.5) an a lot of the (.) time yes it is
(.)
20. but ah: (.) ºwellº (.5) not a:lways
21. (1.5)
22. P1: uhuh?=
23. D1: = no (.5) you might just feel ahm (.) run down for a
long time (.)
24. or low and just not well (.) like you said
25. (1.5)
26. P1: ºri:ghº
27. (.5)
28. D1: and I think the best explanation here is a:: little bit of depression
The pertinent point here is that the information “released” by
D1 in this particular description of what depression really implies
cannot be considered new unless we are to attribute P1 a very
poor memory indeed. It has been established previously (less than
a minute ago within this very consultation) that P1 does not have
suicidal thoughts. A diagnosis of depression has nevertheless been
made and, moreover, D1 also explicitly references earlier stages of
the consultation in which P1 had deﬁned his own symptoms:
“low and just not well, like you said” [E1/L24]. As such, it is
readily available from local context that these things, both of
them consistent with the state of being “run down”, are
symptoms of depression.
In E3, further discursive action of this general order is visible.
In this case, the diagnostic turn is once again delivered highly
cautiously, with D3 explicitly co-implicating P3’s own perspective
into its cautious and explicitly modalised, rather than factual [“I’d
say”—E3/L2] shape, a feature that Maynard (1992) notes is often
present in clinical formulations where a “bad news” receipt is
anticipated.
Extract 3
Previously, P3 has complained chieﬂy of periods of “‘the blues,” lack of focus
and of erratic emotional responses, particularly bouts of unprompted “crying
at work.”]
1. D3: well (.) now ahm.hhh
2. I’d say (.) given everything you’ve to:ld me (.) that you have a bit
of
3. a (.) depression
4. (1.0) is:[ not seri.hh
5. P3: [I supp (.) sorry you↓=
6. D3: =no (.) no carry on
7. (.5)
8. P3: I was just going to say that (.) um (.) I still go out and have fun (.)
and it’s only
9. sometimes that I get (.) upset and silly (.) yesterday I had a
brilliant day and.hh
10. (.) so today I was wondering if I should come to see you (.5) at all
11. D3: you did the right thing (.) depression can be a (.) sporadic thing (.)
it won’t stop
12. you being happy all the time
13. (1.0)
14. P3: so (.) a bit of depression (.) then?
15. D3: yes ((continues))
Herein [E3/4], P3 initiates a section of overlapping talk to
which she herself orients as an interruption (via an apology)
within the same turn. D3, however, releases task and topic control
(ten Have, 1995) and hands the ﬂoor to P3 herself, retroactively
legitimizing her activity, and opening up space for her to proceed.
She then provides an account of her recent behaviour, which
foregrounds the relative normality of most of her life and the
relative scarcity of her episodes of “getting upset and silly” [E3/
L8], and further downgrades the hearable severity of the general
situation with an account of her reasoning process regarding the
need for a GP at all [E3/L9]. Like that of P1 and P2, her discourse
here is demonstrably sensitive to prior activity in the consultation
(in which she has discussed her emotional state extensively), the
implications of the diagnostic category and the manner in which
that diagnosis was delivered. D3 responds to these by (a)
acknowledging the good sense of her decision to see him, and (b)
afﬁrming that depression can indeed be (by implication “in this
case”) sporadic. The consultation then proceeds.
In all three extracts explored in this paper, this broad model of
discursive action would seem to provide a stronger account of
activities than the social-cognitive orthodoxy. This is not, for one
moment, to suggest that there are, therefore, not cases in which
something more akin to the documented localized education
model does operate. Instead, the point is to begin with a closer
exploration of the sense of what individuals are actually and
cooperatively doing, rather than begin with an assumption. From
this point of view, it is visible that the need for a patient to be seen
as a “rational” teller of their own story–a “credible witness”
(Zimmerman, 1992)—can come to the fore when the trustworthi-
ness of that story is prospectively under threat from the
stereotypical implications of being seen as a person with a
mental illness, or the corollary concern that they might
consequently be viewed as an unreliable witness to a report of
any other circumstances. Nevertheless, in the three cases
addressed above, even these issues are managed within the
sequential unfolding of the interaction, and with respect to the
practical business of opening up discursive space without, for
example, directly challenging a clinician’s opinion.
Finally, it is imperative to clarify that none of the above is
designed to propose that, even in the extracts examined, there is
not some order of “education”—addressing misunderstandings
around depression—potentially going on. P1’s explanation that
depression is “not just about feeling really down and hopeless,”
for example, or P3’s clariﬁcation that depression “can be a
sporadic thing” might well serve that function. In each case, the
GP is clearly explaining that one can still be depressed without
displaying severe symptoms. In so doing, however, they actively
preserve their patients’ claims to normalcy, while nonetheless
sustaining the position that those patients are mildly depressed.
We might, thus, argue that the “education model” is operating,
albeit in a limited way, in all of these cases. It is not, however, the
primary concern in how the tricky clinical moments are resolved;
education-talk itself is visibly a device used here in the service of
preserving the patients’ ordinary identities.
Conclusion
The analytic work presented in this paper has explored interac-
tional issues underpinning situated patient resistance to diagnoses
of depression (that is, to question or dispute the diagnosis in the
ﬁrst available turn). The ﬁrst, and most fundamental, of these is
that such activity can be an invited phenomenon, arising from the
GPs’ formulations of depression diagnoses as (potentially, at least)
“bad news.” It would certainly appear, in the three cases above, that
the GPs make an assumption (either from experience, or received
medical wisdom, or both) that the diagnoses they are delivering are
likely to be met with negativity. The consequence of this is that they
actually create the interactional space for the diagnoses to be
questioned. By endeavouring to ease the passage of the diagnosis,
they engender the exact result that the structure of the diagnostic
turn anticipates. As such, at the local level, the notion that
diagnoses of depression are contextually troublesome is potentially
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further perpetuated. This activity is, however, borne of highly
constructive function.
A key matter addressed in relation to these consultations
relates to why, having taken the time to question their depression
diagnoses, these patients are so apparently ready to then go on to
accept them within a few turns. The analysis has, in these cases,
questioned the efﬁcacy of two of the more conventional
psychological explanations for this kind of ostensive volte-face;
namely, underlying (or explicit) power differentials between GP
and patient (Wodak, 1996; Wileman et al., 2002), and the silver
bullet model of instant education (Grifﬁths and Crisp, 2013).
Indeed, on closer inspection of the data, what at ﬁrst seem to be
acts of uncertainty and/or negativity in diagnostic delivery
transpire to be highly practical strategies on the part of the GPs
to open up the ﬂoor, encouraging the patients to negotiate with
them what the diagnosis does or does not mean in this case.
Literature from both discursive and clinical domains converges
on the assertion that, for a diagnostic phase to progress into a
cordial discussion of treatment options, it is highly desirable that
both GP and patient reach some manner of accord with respect to
the character of that diagnosis (Heath, 1992; National Institute
for Clinical Excellence, 2016). By “doing hesitancy” and then
relinquishing their own task and topic control within the
diagnostic phase, the GPs in the cases above allow for exactly
such a co-construction of dialogue around the potentially
awkward diagnosis of depression.
This renders germane the second core issue to emerge from the
analysis, relating to what Harvey Sacks (1984) terms doing “being
ordinary.” In the business of questioning their diagnoses, each of
the patients actively and concurrently works to build a self-
identity that is inferably rational and “normal.” Orienting to a
range of inferential issues arising from being situationally
categorized as a depressed person, and also from their own
activity in having questioned a diagnosis at all, they build
accounts (grounded in a variety of occasioned details from their
own everyday lives) that are intricately designed to forestall their
selves (or their recent behaviour) being viewed as non-rational or,
indeed, obstructive on account of either. In their subsequent
explanations, the GPs produce turns that are sensitive to these
concerns, collaboratively renegotiating the implications of the
diagnosis itself. The patients then actively accept their diagnoses
under these terms, with explicit endorsement from the GPs; in
short, a mutually satisfactory concordance on the nature of that
diagnosis is found (Ijäs-Kallio et al., 2012).
Fundamental to the analyses herein, therefore, have been
illustrations of the constructive functionality of apparently
dysfunctional talk by medical professionals (Silverman, 1997;
Miller, 2013). For example, the widely-cited UK guidebook
“Depression in General Practice” (Tylee et al., 1996) proposes that
when talking about depression with a patient, GPs should be as
“direct” as possible. The diagnostic turns above display activity
that is far from direct, but it is also difﬁcult to sustain an
interpretation of its as evidencing a “lack of conﬁdence” or indeed
“poor practice” when taking into account the positive interac-
tional outcomes. In these cases at least, therefore, by drawing
upon tacit social skills rather than normative frameworks, the
GPs do not visibly exercise “power” in reaching concordance, nor
educate the patients out of their depression-based stigmas with a
silver bullet of new knowledge, but instead open a discursive
space within which a process of further ad-hoc activity can take
place, to demonstrably constructive ends.
Notes
1 These include a reluctance to seek medical attention in the ﬁrst place (Tylee and Jones,
2005; Perry et al., 2007); a reluctance to engage with treatment (Van Voorhees et al.,
2006; Jungbluth and Shirk, 2009); and a non-compliance with treatment regimens,
particularly where these involve anti-depressant medication (Sirey et al., 2001; Lu and
Roughead, 2012).
2 Note: The currently dominant international guideline on the classiﬁcation and diag-
nosis of depression, the Fifth Edition of the American Psychiatric Association’s
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5), presents an intricate
set of nuanced disorders built on the description of a Major Depressive Episode
(American Psychiatric Association, 2013). Since this paper relates to frontline primary
care practice, however, adapted variants relevant to this speciﬁc domain (for example,
National Institute for Clinical Excellence, 2016) are used as key touchstones
throughout.
3 At the most basic level, for an alcoholic to talk about their condition to a room full of
teetotallers is likely to involve a different order of embarrassment or awkwardness to
the act of addressing fellow alcoholics. This is, to a great extent, the very founding
principle of support groups—that some discursive spaces are “safer” than others even
when the topic is the same.
4 Maynard (1991) himself illustrates that these are not unique to medical interaction,
but are primordially a property of everyday talk used particularly around potential
“bad news” disclosures.
5 Notwithstanding Stivers (2006) work on the “grey” ways in which diagnosis can be
received; resistance here, in terms of a critique of the dominant social-cognitive model,
is deﬁned in terms consistent with that approach. See below.
6 Associated investigative issues around this broad discursive paradigm (as compared to,
for example, speech-act theory and semiotics) are also outlined in Miller and
Grimwood (2015)
7 And also those discussed subsequently. As such, the immediately prior turns are not
presented here.
8 Typically “okay,” “yes” or “alright.”
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